COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT, OF ITS OWN RULES
AND ORDERS
"The Workers' Compensation Act ["the Act"] has always been
liberally construed for the benefit of employees and their dependents." Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Williams,
10 Va. App. 516, 519, 392 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1990).
The Commission's construction of the Worker's Compensation Act
is entitled to great weight on appeal. City of Waynesboro v. Harter, 1 Va.
App. 265, 269, 337 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1985). The construction afforded a statute by the
public officials charged with its administration and enforcement is entitled to be given
weight by a court. Lynch v. Lee, 19 Va. App. 230, 232, 450 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1994).
However, courts should withhold deference when the commission's statutory
interpretation conflicts with the language of the statute. Lynch, 19 Va. App.
at 232-33, 450 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting Commonwealth v. May Bros., Inc., 11 Va. App.
115, 119, 396 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1990)).
It is well settled that where the construction of a statute has
been uniform for many years in administrative practice, and has been acquiesced
in by the General Assembly, it is entitled to great weight. Holly Farms v. Carter,
15 Va. App. 29, 42-43, 422 S.E.2d 165, 172 (1992) (quoting Dan River Mills, Inc. v.
Unemployment Comm'n, 195 Va. 997, 1002, 81 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1954)).
"'It is well settled that where the construction of a statute
has been uniform for many years in administrative practice, and has been acquiesced in by
the General Assembly, such construction is entitled to great weight . . . .'" Holly
Farms v. Carter, 15 Va. App. 29, 42-43, 422 S.E.2d 165, 172(1992) (quoting Dan
River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comm'n, 195 Va. 997, 1002, 81 S.E.2d 620, 623
(1954)). The commission consistently has affirmed its adoption of the chain of causation
rule in suicide cases. See, e.g., Ball v. Food Distributors, VWC File No. 1447752
(April 16, 1996); Stone v. Formex, Inc., VWC File No. 165-25-59 (May 15, 1996); Wheeler
v. Pomalco Corporation, VWC File No. 152-93-29 (October 7, 1992); Confer v. Arban
& Carosi, Inc., 63 O.I.C. 66 (1984). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals upheld both
the commission's construction of the statute and the rationale of the majority rule. Food Distribs. v. Estate of
Ball, 24 Va. App. 692, 697, 485 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1997).
The right to compensation under the workmen's compensation law is
granted by statute, and in giving the right the legislature had full power to prescribe
the time and manner of its exercise. When the legislature has spoken plainly it is not the
function of courts to change or amend its enactments under the guise of construing them.
The province of construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity, and that which
is plain needs no interpretation. Dan River, Inc. v. Adkins, 3 Va. App. 320,
328, 349 S.E.2d 667, 671 (1986) (quoting Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403,
407-08, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954)).
It is well established that "[t]he province of [statutory]
construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity, and that
which is plain needs no interpretation." Winston v. City of
Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 408, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954) (citation
omitted). "Words are ambiguous if they admit to `being understood in
more than one way[,]' refer to `two or more things simultaneously[,]' . .
. are `difficult to comprehend,' `of doubtful import,' or lack `clearness
and definiteness.'" Diggs v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 300,
301-02, 369 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1988) (quoting Brown v. Lukhard, 229
Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985)). If "the words of [a] statute
are clear and unambiguous," we "give them their plain
meaning," and the "general rules of statutory construction"
are unnecessary. Diggs, 6 Va. App. at 302, 369 S.E.2d at 200; see Commonwealth
v. May Bros., Inc., 11 Va. App. 115, 118, 396 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1990).
The judiciary may not "change or amend [legislative] enactments under
the guise of construing them." Winston, 196 Va. at 407-08, 83
S.E.2d at 731. Newell
E. Whitehead, Jr. v City of Portsmouth FD, Record No. 2975-98-1
(July 27, 1999).
The main purpose of statutory construction is to determine the
intention of the legislature which, absent constitutional infirmity, must always prevail. Last
v. Virginia State Bd. of Med., 14 Va. App. 906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992)
(quoting Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97, 103, 380 S.E.2d 895,
897 (1989)). Where a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning is to be accepted
without resort to the rules of statutory interpretation. Last, 14 Va. App. at 910,
412 S.E.2d at 205. Unless a literal construction of a statute would result in internally
conflicting provisions amounting to a 'manifest absurdity,' courts cannot construe a
statute in a manner that would result in holding the legislature did not mean what it
actually expressed. Last, 14 Va. App. at 910, 412 S.E.2d at 205(citing Dairyland
Ins. Co. v. Sylva, 242 Va. 191, 194, 409 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1991)). When analyzing a
statute, courts must assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used
when it enacted the relevant statute, and courts are bound by those words when courts
interpret the statute. City of Virginia Beach v. ESG Enters.,Inc., 243 Va. 149,
153, 413 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1992). Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This is a
legislative function. The manifest intention of the legislature, clearly disclosed by its
language, must be applied. Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va.
292,295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560,
566, 29 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1944)). Courts may not add to a statute language which the
legislature has chosen not to include. County of Amherst Bd. of Supervisors v. Brockman,
224 Va. 391, 397, 297 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1992).
The commission has statutory authority to 'make rules and
regulations for carrying out the provisions of [the Act]. Ratliff v. Rocco Farm
Foods, 16 Va. App. 234, 237, 429 S.E.2d 39,41 (1993) (citing Code Sec. 65.2-201(A)).
Because the commission promulgates these rules and has the obligation and right to enforce
them, courts prefer that it have the first opportunity to construe its own rules. Brushy
Ridge Coal Co. v. Blevins, 6 Va. App. 73, 78 n.2, 367 S.E.2d 204, 206 n.2 (1988).
Courts accord great deference to the interpretation given by the commission to its
rules. Consequently, a court’s review is limited to a determination whether
the commission's interpretation of its own rule was reasonable. Classic Floors,
Inc. v. Guy, 9 Va. App. 90, 93, 383 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1989). The VWC will be
"accorded great deference" and its interpretation of its rules "will not be
set aside unless arbitrary and capricious." Virginia Real Estate Bd. v.
Clay, 9 Va. App. 152, 159, 384 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1989).
The commission's construction of the act is entitled to great weight
on appeal. See Bohle ex rel. Majette v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 246 Va. 30,
35, 431 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1993). However, the principle is well established that "'[a]n
erroneous construction by those charged with its administration cannot be permitted to
override the clear mandates of a statute.'" Hurt v. Caldwell, 222 Va. 91, 97,
279 S.E.2d 138, 142 (1981) (quoting City of Richmond v. County of Henrico, 185 Va.
176, 189, 37 S.E.2d 873, 879 (1946)). When an agency's statutory interpretation
conflicts with the language of the statute, the usual deference accorded to an
agency's interpretation should be withheld. Commonwealth Dep't of Mines,
Minerals & Energy v. May Bros., Inc., 11 Va. App. 115, 119, 396 S.E.2d 695,
697(1990); see also Cox v. Oakwood Mining, Inc., 16 Va. App. 965,969, 434 S.E.2d
904, 907 (1993).
"The commission has the power to make and enforce 'rules not
inconsistent with [the Workers' Compensation] Act, for carrying out the provisions of this
Act.'" Specialty Auto Body v. Cook, 14 Va. App. 327, 330, 416 S.E.2d 233, 235
(1992). "When a challenge is made to the commission's construction of its rules, 'our
review is limited to a determination whether the commission's interpretation of its own
rule was reasonable.'" Id. The agency will be "accorded great
deference" and its interpretation of its rules "will not be set aside unless
arbitrary and capricious." Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va. App. 152,
159, 384 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1989), appeal dismissed, 398 S.E.2d 78 (1990).
Terry v. Coe, VWC File No. 171-79-16 [96 WC UNP 1717916] (May
30, 1996); Crusenberry v. Bristol Compressors, VWC File No. 151-41-04 [95 WC UNP
1514104] (Nov. 27, 1995) (issues not addressed in the written statements are waived and
abandoned). "'Because the [commission] promulgates these rules and has the
obligation and right to enforce them, [courts] would prefer that it have the first
opportunity to construe its own rules.'" Arellano v. Pam E. K's Donuts
Shop, 26 Va. App. 478, 482-83, 495 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1998) (quoting Brushy
Ridge Coal Co. v. Blevins, 6 Va. App. 73, 78 n.2, 367 S.E.2d 204, 206 n.2 (1988)).
When construing a
lower court's order, a reviewing court should give deference to the interpretation adopted
by the lower court. See Anderson, 875 F.2d at 80 n.8; Matter of Xonics,
Inc. v. First Wisconsin Financial Corp., 813 F.2d 127, 130 (7th Cir. 1987). These principles apply when interpreting
the adjudicative orders of an administrative agency. Principles applicable to the
construction of judicial judgments and decrees are also instructive. Judgments and decrees entered by courts, and by
extension by non-judicial adjudicative bodies, are the instruments through which they
elect to speak. Thus, when the trier of fact
issues an opinion at the time its decree is entered, the opinion is instructive as to the
decree's reasoning and, by extension, its effect. See
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 158 Va. 647, 653, 164 S.E. 551, 553 (1932) (stating that
opinions entered by a trial court are "often exceedingly useful and frequently serve
to bring to our attention incidents of importance which would otherwise not be noted in
the record, and which could not readily be made to appear, even by bills of
exception"). See also Middle-West
Concrete Forming & Equip. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 267 S.E.2d 742, 745
n.4 (W. Va. 1980) ("Where the written opinion of the trial court is made part of the
record, the reviewing court may consider the written opinion in determining the reasons
for the trial court's rulings and judgment."); State ex rel. Moore v. Munchmeyer,
197 S.E.2d 648, 653 (W. Va. 1973) (stating that a decree should be construed with
reference to the court's intent and to other parts of the record) (citing Beecher v.
Foster, 66 S.E. 643, 645 (W. Va. 1909)). Rusty’s Welding Service, Inc. v. Edward
Wayne Gibson, Record No. 2552-97-2 (February
2, 1999).
Prospective vs Retrospective Statutes. In general, "[t]he
right to compensation in cases of accidental injury is governed by the
law in effect at the time of the injury."
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 10, 365
S.E.2d 782, 787 (1988). "Retrospective laws are not favored, and a
statute is always to be construed as operating prospectively, unless a
contrary intent is manifest; but the legislature may, in its
discretion, pass retrospective and curative laws provided they do not
partake of the nature of what are technically called ex post facto laws,
and do not impair the obligation of contracts, or disturb vested rights;
and provided, further, that they are of such nature as the legislature
might have passed in the first instance to act prospectively." Cohen
v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 12 Va. pp. 702, 705, 407 S.E.2d 329, 330-31
(1991) (citation omitted). "[S]ubstantive
rights are addressed in statutes which created duties, rights, or
obligations. In contrast, . .
. procedural or remedial statutes merely set forth the methods of
obtaining redress or enforcement of rights."
Id. at 705, 407 S.E.2d at 331. for the 1991 statutory change
"to apply retroactively, . . . it must be procedural in nature and
affect remedy only, disturbing no substantive or vested rights.
The statute must also contain an expression of retrospective
legislative intent." Cohen,
12 Va. App. at 705, 407 S.E.2d at 331 (citations omitted). Dennis
K. Pennington v. Superior Iron Works, Record No. 1680-98-4 (August
17, 1999). WP
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The commission determined that a deputy's
correspondence to counsel, "granting the request to
reconsider [the earlier] opinion" and promising to "issue a
ruling on the merits" after further "review of the
evidence," "in effect, vacated the original opinion."
The commission, therefore, decided that the deputy "had
jurisdiction to issue the May 20, 1998, opinion." "[I]t is
within the commission's discretion to . . . examine the [order] of the
deputy commissioner . . . to ascertain the result intended," and we
will not disturb the commission's determination unless "arbitrary or
capricious." Rusty's
Welding Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 130, 510 S.E.2d 255,
260-61 (1999) (en banc). "[T]he Deputy Commissioner who has rendered
an initial ruling retains jurisdiction over the claim for twenty (20)
days" and "may vacate or amend [the] original opinion"
within such period. See Code
Sec. 65.2-705(A);
Rule 3.1, Rules of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Basic
Construction Company v. Hamilton, Record No.
2844-98-1 (August 17, 1999). WP
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While employed by Jim Doyan, an uninsured contractor,
claimant suffered an industrial injury to his right eye on April 6, 1998.
Although Doyan learned of the accident and injury immediately after the
occurrence, neither Doyan nor claimant advised Waltrip, claimant's
statutory employer, of the incident. On June 29, 1998, claimant lodged a
"Claim for Benefits" with the commission, resulting in a
"Notification Letter" to both Doyan and Waltrip, dated July 28,
1998, which reported the pending claim and requested related
documentation. Waltrip filed a "First Report of Accident" on
November 16, 1998, and the commission, on December 3, 1998, issued
"Notice of [a] Hearing" scheduled for January 19, 1999.
The legislative, administrative and judicial history of Code Sec. 65.2-600
clearly suggests that the legislature intended, by the amendment, that the
potential responsibility of a statutory employer for a claim under the
Act, absent timely notice of the related accident, be resolved upon
considerations different from those enumerated in Code Sec. 65.2-600(D),
applicable to actual employers. The attenuated, oftentimes remote,
relationship between the statutory employer and the worker, together with
the need to preserve the rights and responsibilities of each, required a
balancing of competing interests through a distinct procedural course.
Thus, the legislature, while mandating notice of an accident within thirty
days of the occurrence to both statutory and actual employers, fashioned a
threshold inquiry specific to a determination of responsibility under the
Act upon a statutory employer without timely notice of the accident. Under
such circumstances, the statutory employer must have received at
"least sixty days notice of the hearing to ascertain compensability
of the accident" and suffered no prejudice from "lack of
notice." Mindful of prior judicial construction and application
of the notice requirements prescribed by Code Sec. 65.2-600(A)
and (D) and its precursors, the General Assembly, in 1997, amended Code
Sec. 65.2-600(A)
to render a statutory employer, without "notice of the
accident," responsible for related compensation awarded by the
commission, if such statutory employer is afforded sixty days notice of
the attendant hearing and "was not prejudiced by lack of notice of
the accident." Thus, the amendment established a liability test
unique to those statutory employers without timely notice of the accident,
one apart from the reasonable excuse/prejudice inquiry prescribed for
actual employers by Code Sec. 65.2-600(D),
and the commission applied the revised Code Sec. 65.2-600(A)
analysis to the instant claim. "Well established 'principles of
statutory construction require us to ascertain and give effect to the
legislative intent.'" Brooks v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 563,
566, 454 S.E.2d 3, 4 (1995) (citation omitted). "When new provisions
are added to existing legislation by amendment, we presume that the
legislature 'acted with full knowledge of and in reference to the existing
law upon the same subject and the construction placed upon it by the
courts[,] . . . that the legislature acted purposefully with the intent to
change existing law." Burke v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 183,
188, 510 S.E.2d 743, 745-46 (1999) (citations omitted). When "'the
several provisions of a statute suggest a potential for conflict or
inconsistency,'" we must construe such "'provisions so as to
reconcile them and to give full effect to the expressed legislative
intent.'" Herrel
v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 579, 585, 507 S.E.2d 633, 636
(1998) (citation omitted). Finally, "'[t]he construction afforded a
statute by the public officials charged with its administration and
enforcement is entitled to be given weight by a court.'" Lynch v.
Lee, 19 Va. App. 230, 232, 450 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1994) (citation
omitted). Uninsured
Employer's Fund v. M.L. Edwards and J. Doyan, Record No. 2476-99-1
(July 18, 2000). WP
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"When amendments
are enacted soon after controversies arise 'as to the interpretation of
the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative
interpretation of the original act . . . .'" Boyd v. Commonwealth,
216 Va. 16, 20-21, 215 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1975). Arturo
Rios v. Ryan Inc. Central, Record No. 0804-00-2 (March 6,
2001). WP
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Releases. The Workers' Compensation Commission
exceeded its authority in ordering an employee to execute a release
authorizing his employer's attorney, and anyone authorized by his
employer's attorney, to obtain from the Social Security Administration
information concerning the employee.
During discovery, the employer's second request for
production of documents asked Arvizu to "[p]roduce a statement from the
Social Security Administration detailing your work status in the United
States on September 28, 2000." Accompanying this request was an
"Authorization for Release of Social Security Information," which states
as follows: I, Jose Luis Arvizu, SS#[number deleted], hereby request and
authorize the Social Security Administration, if requested by Linda M.
Gillen, Esquire, to furnish her or anyone designated in writing by her,
all
records and documentation and any other information that she may request
pertaining to my employment status in the United States. Linda M.
Gillen shall retain the original signed copy of this Release in her
records. A true and correct copy shall be considered sufficient
authorization of the release of all records or information.
The deputy commissioner denied the employer's motion to
compel further responses to the initial requests for admissions but
ordered Arvizu "to respond to Employer's Second Request for Production of
Documents and to execute the Release of Social Security Information within
the time proscribed." Arvizu responded to the second request for
production of documents by delivering to the commission and employer's
attorney a copy of a letter his attorney sent to the Social Security
Administration. In pertinent part, that letter is as follows:
Please be advised I represent Mr. Arvizu in his claim for workers'
compensation benefits before the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Commission. Mr. Arvizu is requesting a detail or letter regarding
his work status on September 28, 2000. I have enclosed a
Designation of Representation form and a Release of Information form for
your file in order to obtain the requested information. Thank you
for your cooperation and assistance in this matter. The commission
affirmed the deputy commissioner's decision to require Arvizu to sign the
release.
Notwithstanding the employer's interest in learning Arvizu's
employment status, the issue presented by this appeal is whether the
commission had the authority to order the release as a method of obtaining
the information.
The statute upon which the commission relied for authority to
order Arvizu to execute the release states in pertinent part as follows:
The Commission may require the claimant to present evidence of filing
for Federal Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits in order
to establish eligibility under this section and also may require the
claimant to furnish the employer with the decision on his claim for such
federal benefits. Code Sec. 65.2-709(B) (emphasis added).
Nothing within this statutory provision purports to give
the commission the authority to order Arvizu to sign a release authorizing
the employer to obtain information from the Social Security
Administration. The plain language of the statute only authorizes
the commission to require an employee to present evidence to the
commission or the employer.
The Rules of the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Commission, including Rule 1.8(K), do not expressly authorize the ordering
of a release such as occurred in this case. Significantly,
before ordering Arvizu to sign the release, the commission did not order
Arvizu to produce for inspection documents from the Social Security
Administration he had the power to obtain.
Jose Luis
Arvizu v. Archie D Gold, Record No. 2651-01-2 (August 13, 2002).
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